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Abstract 
The issue of pricing nature reserves becomes more relevant as budgetary constraints 
become a limiting factor for their proper operation. This paper considers and 
compares different pricing alternatives for managing Nature Reserves (NRs) and 
applies them to two nature reserves in Israel. We compare 4 pricing strategies: Free 
entrance, maximum revenue pricing, cost recovery pricing and differential pricing. 
These strategies were implemented to both the existing situation and to a development 
scenario in which an upgrade in the Nature reserve is considered. The analysis was 
implemented on two nature reserves in Israel: Darga Nature Reserve (DNR), an open 
reserve where no entrance fee is charged, and Gamla Nature Reserve (GNR), a closed 
reserve, where an entrance fee is charged. Benefits were derived using the Travel Cost 
Method (TCM).  
Results show that differential pricing is the most cost effective policy. It recovers 
costs in both policy scenarios with the least dead weight loss (DWL). The 
consequence of the differential pricing however, is that there is a cross subsidy of the 
Gamla NR in 45 – 80 percent depending on the scenario analyzed.  It was shown that 
there are conditions in which only a cross subsidy can make a development plan 
sustainable. 
Usually, policy makers differentiate pricing according to the characteristics of the 
visitors.  That is, different prices are determined for domestic and international 
visitors, the elderly and the young, etc. Differential pricing among different reserves 
provides another tool for policy makers that can be consistent with cost recovery 
while minimizing DWL. Another potential advantage is that site differentiating causes 
less social tension due to the pricing being tailored not to a person, but rather to a site. 
 
Key words: Nature reserves, Pricing, Cost benefit analysis 
JEL classification: Q26
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1. Introduction 
 
Protected natural areas (or nature reserves) were, and still are, the cornerstone of 
nature conservation efforts. They were established in order to manage resources in a 
proper way according to what we define as the in situ value (Krutilla, 1967) of the 
resources. The major goals of nature reserves were originally to benefit society 
through (controlled) visitations (use value) and to bring indirect benefits to society 
(non use values). Revenue generation was not a consideration.  In fact, the idea was to 
provide access as freely as possible for both economic reasons (Public goods) and 
philosophical ones ("Nature belongs to everyone").  
In recent years, the role of nature reserves was re-evaluated. Economic realities forced 
decision makers to take into account the opportunity costs of nature preservation. The 
increasing demand for land, the alternative commercial uses and, in general, the ever 
increasing limiting factors of general budgetary constraints, forced decision makers to 
look for a financial economic rationale to preserve nature while still trying to allocate 
the necessary resources.  
In order to deal better with the conflict between commercial exploitation and nature 
preservation, valuation theory was developed. The willingness to pay (WTP) 
criterion, both derived from indirect as well as direct methods, gave a clear direction 
on how to deal with this issue. However, valuation studies do not usually deal with 
the financial issue of the preservation dilemma. The notion of serving the public 
dictates that the government should pay for the operation and development costs of 
nature preservation from the general tax collecting system. Thus, while the benefits 
usually relate to the visitors of the reserve (use value) or the general population (non-
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use value), costs are acute and borne directly by the government, which represents the 
taxpayers. The correlation between tax payment and nature is not direct at all. 
Nature tourism or Eco - tourism as it is now popularly called is one source of benefit 
which can be easily translated from an economic to a financial one. While there may 
be strong arguments for free access to Nature reserves, there is no argument 
whatsoever that in a society that faces budgetary restrictions, this issue should not be 
analyzed based on different alternatives.     
Usually, visitors contribute to revenue by paying entrance fees. However, there are 
other ways to collect money such as paying for attractions while the visitors are inside 
the reserve, paying a special fee for accommodations, food and fuel. Each method has 
benefits and detriments. In this paper we will deal only with the issue of entrance fees. 
This issue by itself has sparked a great deal of argument regarding the question of 
whether we should or shouldn't price NRs. This paper will deal mainly with the 
question of how to price nature reserves, but it should be remembered that the answer 
to this question (how?) is derived from the question: should we? The answer to the 
latter is determined in the political arena and thus, at least in this paper, is considered 
to be an exogenous issue. 
Once we consider the issue of pricing as described, we can then consider which form 
constitutes the most desirable pricing system. While this is a second best policy, it still 
deserves consideration on the basis of efficiency. While free access is one reference 
point, the other is maximum revenue pricing. In between, we can analyze cost 
recovery pricing. If we assume that most of the costs of operating NRs are fixed, free 
access is consistent with the marginal pricing system while cost recovery is an 
average one. Maximum revenue pricing is a business strategy which does not conform 
to pricing NRs on its own. However, maximum revenue pricing is a reference point in 
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cases in which one wishes to collect more payments than the actual cost. For a given 
NR, it does not make sense, but it does make sense for a system of reserves. The 
argument for that is that if we want to use a differential pricing system, there are some 
reserves which should subsidize others. The direction is, therefore, towards maximum 
revenue generation but not in all reserves and not exactly at the maximum revenue 
price, but somewhere between that price and the cost of price recovery. 
There are several ways to differentiate with respect to admission price: Differentiation 
by volume, by individuals and by sites. Volume differentiation can be achieved 
through membership which can grant you a reduced price (or even fee admission) to 
enter NRs. Differentiation by individuals can be made through different prices to 
domestic vs. international visitors, students, the elderly etc.. Differentiation by site 
means that a given individual pays a different price at different sites. Policy makers 
should not ignore any one of these possibilities when planning for a (second best) 
efficient pricing system.  
In this paper we deal only with the third type of price differentiation, namely, 
differential pricing by sites. We leave the other options for further research although 
there are other studies which have dealt with this issue (e.g., Tobias and Mendelssohn, 
1993 among others) but did not derive the optimal price gap between different groups. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of different pricing systems on both 
revenue generation as well as efficiency. We compare four pricing systems: zero 
prices, maximum revenue price, cost recovery price and price differentiation systems. 
This is done for the Darga River Nature Reserve (DNR) and the Gamla Nature 
Reserve (GNR) in Israel. We analyze the pricing systems under two policy systems: 
The first one is the existing system in which we treat the operation costs of both NRs 
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as given. The second policy is an upgrade in the services provided in the DNR. We 
chose to perform the development analysis on this reserve because, as opposed to the 
GNR, the DNR is an open reserve which does not require an entrance fee. Such 
reserves are the most vulnerable since they have to rely on outside sources rather than 
reserves which generate their own revenue. 
In order to perform the analysis, a valuation study (TCM) was carried out in both 
reserves to estimate their value (existing and in the case of DNR also future value) 
and especially their demand function. Those functions enable us to compare 
visitations, benefits and prices under different scenarios.   
The paper continues as follows: In the next section we explore some issues and 
provide a brief literature review regarding pricing of NRs. Section 3 describes the 
NRs and especially DNR in which future development is an issue to be considered. 
Section 4 outlines the theoretical model that will be used for the comparative analysis 
- the four different pricing strategies. Section 5 describes the results for the existing 
situation in both reserves, while section 6 repeats section 5 with a development option 
at the DNR. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Issues and Literature review in pricing natural reserves:   
The issue of pricing public parks and nature reserves is common to many countries be 
they developed (e.g., Knapman and Stoeckl 1995) or developing (e.g., Chase et al., 
1998).  
Many parks do not have entrance fees. This includes even municipal parks such as the 
Central Park in New-York or St. James Park in London. However, in recent years, it 
has become increasingly apparent that parks and nature reserves cannot rely solely on 
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government funding and must charge entrance fees in order to manage the site 
properly.  
There are economic and other social arguments both in favor of pricing parks and 
against it.  
 
Arguments in favor of pricing parks:  
1) "Pay as you use": Managing and operating the park should be financed by those 
who enjoy it and not with the tax payer's money, especially if the site has a demand 
and those that "purchase" the commodity are willing to pay for it.  
2) Limited governmental budget: the government does not allocate enough money to 
manage the park; therefore it needs to be priced. Policy makers are aware of the fact 
that subsidizing parks can cause a loss in social welfare and since the budget is 
limited, it is better to invest in places where the social benefit will be higher.  
3) Carrying capacity: too many visitors can be a burden on the ecological carrying 
capacity of the park or the reserve which has unique natural treasures. Too many 
visitors can be a burden on the social carrying capacity of the park as well, and create 
disturbance to other visitors. The demand for the congested park will drop, raising 
benefit for the remaining visitors (Sibley 2001).  
4) Upgrading nature reserves: upgrading services to visitors requires funding, and 
therefore the cost to operate the park is higher.  
5) Less visited parks: parks that are less visited but need investment can be managed 
through price differentiation (Chase et al. 1998). In a park where demand is rigid 
(such as Masada World-Heritage park in Israel), it is possible to charge a higher 
entrance fee and use the extra revenue to finance the upgrades to the less visited 
parks.  
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Arguments against pricing parks:  
1) Public goods: Nature belongs to everyone; therefore there is no reason to price it. If 
the park is open to all with government funding, there is no marginal cost for each 
additional visitor as in other public goods. Hence, entrance fees will cause DWL.  
2) Nature is there: nature was not manufactured; therefore there is no cost for 
providing it and it is immoral to price it. Pricing nature will result in lower social 
welfare.   
3) Equality in using Nature: pricing parks will create a situation where only those who 
can afford it will be able to partake in it. Since Nature belongs to all levels of society, 
it would be unjust to price it. In addition, the country has an interest that all its 
citizens enjoy Nature for educational purposes.  
 
The theoretical basis for this controversy is that efficiency in pricing a public good 
such as a nature reserve requires equality between marginal cost and marginal benefit 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984). However, since marginal cost is commonly less 
than the average cost (most of the time even approaches to zero) in such public goods, 
it creates a problem of cost recovery. Thus, an efficient pricing requires a subsidy to 
sustain operation and this, in turn, may penalize non-users.  
Pricing entrance fees is dependent upon what one wants to achieve (Laarman and 
Gregersen, 1996).  While allowing free entrance may appear to maximize social 
benefit (or may be most appealing to society at large), it ignores the issue of cost 
recovery. However, maximization of revenue at the other end of the spectrum is 
unjustifiable as a sole target.  The gap between these two approaches can be 
significant; price ratio between maximum revenue and cost recovery policies has been 
shown to reach as much as 15 (Walpole et al. 2001). One of the problems associated 
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with entrance fees is that the management costs are so high that they are not covered 
by entrance fees alone (Willis, 2003). This problem is empirically presented in our 
study since the entrance fee to DNR in different scenarios is about 2 New Israeli 
Shekels (NIS)
2
 per visitor (Probably a small amount deserves collecting).  
It should be noted that in some countries, such as Canada, parks are run as a business, 
with very low governmental funding. While entrance fees are higher, the overall result 
is a more efficient management and better services (Van Sickle and Eagles, 1998).  
In some cases pricing can achieve other goals besides cost recovery. Cullen (1985) 
and Fractor (1982) have compared pricing with other means to ration entrance to 
nature reserves and found it to be more efficient compared to alternatives such as a 
lottery or a “first come first serve” system. 
Average pricing can be used to overcome the cost recovery problem. However, the 
amount of nature provision is less than the optimal which in turn creates a DWL. 
Ramsey (1927) demonstrated a second best pricing rule that achieves cost recovery at 
a minimum DWL. This requires setting the prices of any two goods in an inverse 
relation to their price elasticity. This may be applied to any two NRs as well as two 
services within a given reserve. 
An alternative is to set a two – tier pricing system in which visitors pay an entrance 
fee equal to the marginal cost and in addition they are charged a lump sum fee to 
cover fixed costs (Rosenthal et. al., 1984). 
Charging an entrance fee has been criticized also on the basis of its effect on equity 
(Adams, et. al., 1989; Walsh at al. 1989). The argument is that those who are affected 
the most are low earners. This can be tackled by differentiating among income classes 
or offering free access to NRs on low use days. This argument of peak – load pricing 
                                                 
2  1 NIS = 0.25 USD or 0.17 Euro cents.  
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can be used also to differentiate entrance fees in order to reduce congestion and 
ecological costs. 
Studies concerning pricing nature sites have been done in countries such as Australia 
(Herath, 2004), China (Chen et. al., 2004) Italy (Willis, 20003), Portugal (Mendes, 
2002) and Costa Rica (Chase at. al., 1988). Most of the studies found a potential to 
raise sufficient revenues if prices were set in a way that at least allowed for cost 
recovery. For example Herath (2004) found that the value of visiting 5 parks in 
Australia was significantly larger than the allocated budget: a value of 1.3 Billion 
Aus$. This was contrasted with an allocated budget of 48.7 Million Aus$ of which 
current revenues from entrance fees were only 4.1 Million Aus$. Chen et. al. (2004) 
found that an additional fee of $0.84 per visitor would be required in order to recover 
costs. 
In the USA, the USDA (2001) provides an extensive reading list regarding entrance 
fees to parks and nature reserves. This list includes studies that attempt to compare the 
pros and cons of different pricing techniques used in different parks in the USA and 
their impact on visitation rates. 
Price segmentation or differential pricing is one appealing option to manage nature 
reserves in a more flexible way. This is because there are more degrees of freedom as 
to the amount and distribution of fees.  
Differential pricing techniques can be used to maximize profit if demand price 
elasticities are different among different segments (Dolan, 1995; Grant and 
Schlesinger, 1995). They can also be used in public projects where the Ramsey rule 
dictates how to tax goods. This has been done with respect to user fees for using roads 
(Brent, 1995; Kirkpatrick) and landing fees at airports (Morrison, 1982).  
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Nature reserves may use differential pricing techniques as well. Basically, the main 
objective is to differentiate between users within a given site. For example Tobias and 
Mendelssohn (1993) and Navrud and Mongatana (1994) differentiated between local 
and international visitors in order to analyze different pricing techniques. However, 
the main focus in these two articles as well as others is the valuation segment and not 
the cost recovery problem. Willis (2003) found out that price differentiation between 
visitors raised the public benefit of the Royal Wood of Capodimonte in Naples, Italy. 
It was shown that free entrance to retired people and a 50% discount for students was 
a better alternative than having a unified price for all. Chase et al. (1998) used CVM 
in three parks in Costa-Rica and analyzed three pricing methods. It was found that 
cross-subsidy is possible among parks that offer similar activities. Differential pricing 
can shift visitors from one park to the other, mitigate congestion in one and create 
more job opportunities in others. 
Nevertheless, in many cases there is not enough information to create a specific 
linkage between the value of the reserve and the price that should be charged at the 
entrance gate (Loomis 2000). The missing linkage lies within the valuation and 
pricing decisions which are the main contribution of the current manuscript. 
 
3. Research sites 
Darga River Nature Reserve is located on the Eastern side of the Judea desert, rising 
up from the shores of the Dead Sea. The Darga River is one of the most beautiful and 
impressive rivers that runs through the desert towards the Dead Sea. It is a dry river, 
which runs deep through rocks and canyons and attracts many hikers and extreme 
sport lovers. The site also offers the solitude of the desert. The ecosystem in DNR 
includes raptors, mammals, reptiles and plants, some of which are endangered or 
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vulnerable. This is a very delicate ecosystem which can easily become unstable with 
any slight changes, especially anthropogenic ones such as illegal hunting, the cutting 
of plants for heating, dumping of garbage and crushing of the earth's crust with off-
road-vehicles.  
Gamla Nature Reserve is located in the center of the Golan Heights. The reserve 
contains the highest waterfall in Israel (51 meters high), archeological sites including 
the remnants of ancient Gamla, a field of dolmens and the largest but yet very 
vulnerable Griffon Vulture colony in the country, which is its main attraction.   
 
The economic problem at DNR 
Our starting point is the DNR since it is an open reserve and thus the most vulnerable. 
We have defined several economic problems at the reserve. The budget allocated to 
manage the reserve is not large enough. It is possible that the benefit from the reserve 
is higher than its operating costs, but this does not necessarily show economic 
efficiency since it is possible to take further measures that require more funding but at 
the same time raise the benefit of the reserve.  
In order to know if this is in fact the situation, we need to measure a few parameters:  
 Operating costs in the current situation 
 Benefits in the current situation 
 Additional costs in order to manage the reserve in an optimal ecological 
manner 
 Additional benefit from the reserve as a result of upgrading its management 
 
Cost data was obtained from the local rangers. They include current costs as well as 
upgraded costs according to what the rangers would have liked to see in the place. 
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The benefit data was obtained with a combination of actual and hypothetical TCM. 
The end result was a current value and an upgraded one of the reserve.  The next step 
was to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to examine if the upgrade was economically 
justified. 
The question remains – how to finance the upgrading plan? The problem is that 
charging entrance fees is associated with a drop in visitors. An estimate of the 
connection between entrance fee and its effect on visitors needs to be evaluated.  
 
4. Theoretical Background  
4.1 Different pricing methods 
Assume two nature reserves, X and Y, were the benefits from them is a function of the 
number of visitors at each site. We assume for the moment that the attributes are 
given but later we will relax that assumption. 
The benefit function can be written in a general form as: 
)()2.4(
)()1.4(
YY
XX
VgTB
VfTB


 
Were VX,Y stands for the number of visitors at sites X and Y. 
The cost function is given by: 
BAVbVaTC YX  )()()3.4(  
Were: 
a, b stands for variable cost as a function of visitors  
A, B stands for the fixed cost which is not a direct function of the number of visitors
3
. 
                                                 
3  In nature reserves that have a significant non-use value, this is of special importance since the non-
use value is not a function of visitors. 
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The social problem is to maximize the net benefit function subject to the constraint 
that the revenues charged at both parks are just enough to cover the costs of operating 
them: 
))()(()()()()()4.4( BAVbVaVPVPBAVbVaVgVf YXYYXXYXYX  
 
Were λ = the shadow price of the revenue generation constraint and PX and PY are the 
price charged for using the parks. These prices are also the marginal benefit of visits
4
, 
f'(VX) and g'(VY). Note also that the number of visits is a function of price, that is: 
VX(PX) and VY(PY). 
Differentiating (4.4) with respect to PX, PY and λ and rearranging terms we get: 
x
y
YY
Xx
VbP
VaP





)('
)('
)5.4(  
The left hand side of (4.5) is the markup over the marginal cost in percentage terms 
while ηx,y is the demand elasticity for the parks. In the case of negligible marginal cost 
where a'(Vx,y) → 0, the left hand side of the equation is simply the ratio of the 
entrance prices. The intuition behind this first order condition is that the park with the 
more elastic demand will have a lower price than the other park. This is the Ramsey 
condition for pricing public goods under budget constraint (Ramsey, 1927). Since in 
most cases elasticilties changes along the demand curve, pricing policy is a policy tool 
which decision makers should be aware of.  
Ramsey pricing is supposed to minimize deadweight loss (DWL) while meeting the 
budget constraint. However, policy makers might have other goals rather than 
minimizing DWL. In order to compare the trade-off among different goals we 
compare Ramsey pricing to: 
                                                 
4  When there is only one park and only one price, then the only solution is to charge an average cost 
price. This will be analyzed also in the empirical part of the paper. 
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 Free access (the operating cost is paid by the government through lump-sum 
taxes). The first order condition is given by: 
0)(')6.4( , YXVf ,  
That is the marginal benefit of each park is set to be equal to the marginal cost 
which is 0. 
 Cost recovery pricing policy. This can be implemented either by a two part 
pricing system or an average pricing in the case of a single price system. In 
this paper we used only an average price system, hence: 
XX VAP /)7.4(    For park X and  
YY VBP /)8.4(    For park Y. 
 Maximum profit (or revenue in the case of zero variable costs).  
BAVbVaVPVPMax YXYYXX  )()(.)9.4(  
Throughout the analysis we assume zero variable cost and hence marginal costs
5
. At 
least, In Israel, and we believe that this is not an exception, the costs associated with 
an additional visitor is negligible within a very wide range of visitors.  
When marginal price is zero, the DWL is derived from the difference between the 
total benefit under free access and the given price strategy (maximum revenue, 
Ramsey pricing, or cost recovery). The total benefit is simply the area under the 
marginal benefit curve which is actually the demand curve. 
 
4.2 Development of nature reserves 
                                                 
5  Mendes (2002) assumes marginal cost but acknowledges that in order for the public good argument 
to hold, they (marginal costs) should be low enough. 
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There are cases in which attributes of the nature reserve could be upgraded. In order 
to do that, more funds should be raised and the issue of who should carry this burden 
is of policy relevance
6
. 
A necessary condition to justify a development plan is to construct a cost-benefit test.  
This is presented in fig. 4.1: 
Figure 4.1 about here 
 
 
Suppose price increased from P0 to P1 to finance the new investment. This creates a 
loss in the consumer surplus and thus in benefit to society. This is represented by the 
shaded area S1 in fig. 4.1. On the other hand, the investment in the NR increased its 
quality and hence, the marginal benefit curve shifted out to the right from MB0 to 
MB1. Under the new quality, there is a change in consumer surplus, given by the 
shaded area, S2. A necessary condition for the project to be worthwhile is that S2 is 
greater than S1. Note that if we assume a given investment plan, we also assume no 
degrees of freedom in the price change. It should be determined in such a way that the 
total revenue under the new price is able to finance operation AND the cost of the 
new development plan
7
. 
The analysis changes when we have two NRs. This situation is presented in figure 
4.2: 
Figure 4.2 about here 
 
Here we test an upgrade in NR 2, financed by a price increase in NR 1. There is an 
increase in the benefit in NR 2 since the marginal benefit curve shifted to the right. 
                                                 
6  For example, investing in a park where the main purpose of the investment is to handle the non-use 
value component doesn’t have to be financed by visitors. 
7  In this study we present a cost benefit test but when the number of opportunities is large enough, an 
optimization can be performed in order to find the best upgrade level. 
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However, it is paid by NR 1 visitors. This creates a DWL but also creates revenue. 
The revenue should be set in such a way as it can finance the development plan in NR 
2. If the resulting DWL is lower than the one resulting in a self finance scenario, than 
a cross subsidy is efficient.  
 
5. Valuation 
TCM was conducted in order to estimate the values of the sites, reflected in the travel 
costs incurred by the visitors. According to the TCM hypothesis, the demand for visits 
decreases as travel costs rise. Therefore, visitation rates from distant areas will be less 
than those from closer ones.  
In addition, we controlled for number of children, education and income levels by 
adding them as additional explaining variables.  
270 questionnaires were distributed at GNR out of which 243 were completed. At 
DNR, 270 out of the 296 were completed. 
Travel Cost analysis was adopted by using the above mentioned socio-economic 
variables as well as the cost of travel, the alternative cost of time and entrance fee to 
the site.  
We controlled for multi-site visitation by asking the respondents to fill in how many 
places they have visited during their trip. Usually the visit at both sites is the primary 
or the only reason for the trip mainly because it requires almost an entire day for 
driving and touring the site. However, in cases where visitors declared more than one 
site as their reason for the travel we have divided the travel cost by the amount of time 
they spent at the site relative to the total time spent on the entire trip. There is more 
than one way to deal with this problem (See Ward and Beal (2000) for alternative 
ways to deal with the issue).  
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The alternative value of the travel time has been found to be a fraction of the wage of 
the respondents. We used 25% of the hourly wage as a proxy for a driving hour. The 
conventional practice is to use between 25 – 50 percent depending on the purpose of 
the trip (Cesario, 1978).  
One way to account for the relationship between dependent and independent variables 
is to assume it is linear. In this case, we assumed a linear relationship between the 
visitation frequencies in 10 regions consecutively increasing in distance of 30 km 
each from the travel site. That is: 
iiiii SOCTCpopV   )()()/()1.5(  
Where: 
Vi = Visits from region i. 
Popi = Population in region i. 
α and β and δ are parameters to be estimated 
TCMi = Travel cost from region i. 
SOCi = A vector of Socio demographic characteristics. 
ε = is an error term. 
 
However, since the number of visits is non-negative, Herath and Kennedy (2004) 
suggests using as an alternative the semi-logarithmic functional form: 
iii i
SOCTC
ii epopV
 

 )()(
/)2.5(  
Where all the variables were previously determined. 
 
An additional characteristic of the TCM is that since it draws from on-site surveys, 
frequent visitors are more likely to be surveyed.   As a consequence, the econometric 
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model should be corrected for self- selection bias. Therefore a count model based on a 
Poisson distribution is more suitable (Hellerstein 1992). The model can be written as: 
!/)())/((Pr)3.5( )( jeJFjpopVob
j
Pii
  
Where: 
iii i
SOCTC
e


 

 )()(
 
 j denotes possible values for the visitation rate.  
FP(.) = is the cumulative distribution function of the standard Poisson probability 
model 
λ = Poisson parameter (non negative) to be estimated (Green, 2000). 
 
The regression results of the travel frequency as a function of TCM and other socio-
economic variables are given in table 5.1 for GNR and DNR respectively.  
 
Table 5.1 and 5.2 about here 
 
Although all the coefficients have the expected sign, none but the travel cost and the 
intercept were found to be significant. Therefore, only the travel cost coefficient and 
the intercept were used to simulate the different number of visits at different prices. 
 
In order to estimate the demand functions themselves, we used the visit frequency 
functions for simulating the impact of price increase on the total visit from each of the 
10 regions. This was done in steps of 20 NIS each until the visits diminished to zero. 
The last step was to sum the number of visits from each region for every price level. 
 20 
We then regressed visits on implied prices and integrated to find the area beneath the 
function result in the value of the site. 
In what follows we present only the results concerning the linear function (Valuation 
results of other functional forms can be found in Becker et. al, 2006 and Becker and 
Choresh, 2007).. Adding the other two functional forms complicates the results but 
adds nothing new.  
The two demand functions are given for GNR and DNR in (5.2) and (5.3) 
respectively: 
(5.2)     Pg = 354.49 – 0.0037Vg 
(5.3)     Pd = 30– 0.0005Vd     
    
6. Pricing mechanisms under the existing situation 
6.1. Independent management 
As can be seen clearly, there is an order of magnitude in both absolute size of the 
demand as well as the elasticity of demand. This is presented in figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 about here 
 
In order to estimate the effect of price change on revenue, we present the relation 
between price charged and revenue generated for GNR and DNR in figures 6.2 and 
6.3 respectively. 
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 about here 
 
As can be seen from figures 6.2 and 6.3, the maximum revenue generating price is 
177 NIS and 15 NIS at the GNR and the DNR. Currently the entrance fee is 23 NIS 
and 0 (free entrance) at the GNR and the DNR respectively.  
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The on going operating cost at the GNR and the DNR are estimated at 1,066,050 NIS 
and 108,000 NIS respectively. We can use the estimated demand functions in order to 
calculate the price that will equate total revenue to total cost. This is the cost recovery 
pricing system. For the GNR, the cost recovery price is 11.5 NIS while for the DNR 
the cost recovery price is 1.92 NIS (in this paper we ignore the argument that entrance 
fees should not be implemented if administrative costs are too high).  
Both policies which increase the price, cause a reduction of visitors associated with it  
and since the marginal cost is almost zero, there is an associated DWL with any 
positive price. That is a trade-off that should be considered; DWL increase against 
increased revenues. This is demonstrated in figures 6.4 and 6.5 for GNR and DNR 
respectively.   
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 about here 
 
The interesting point demonstrated in the last two graphs is that the trade-off between 
DWL and TR holds until the maximum revenue generating price. While TR has a 
hyperbolic shape, the DWL has a positive one. Hence, further increasing the price 
above the maximum revenue level, would cause both the DWL to increase and the TR 
to decrease. The relevant trade-off question is only to the left of the peak of the TR 
graph. 
A comparative analysis of the three pricing mechanisms (zero, maximum revenue 
generation and cost recovery) is given in tables 6.1 and 6.2 for the GNR and DNR 
respectively.    
Table 6.1 and 6.2 about here 
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As can bee clearly seen, the cost recovery pricing mechanism requires an admission 
price of 11.5 NIS at GNR while it requires only 1.92 NIS at the DNR. Maximum 
revenue generation can be achieved through a price increase to 177 and 15 NIS at 
GNR and DNR respectively. This is about 15 and 7 times more than the cost recovery 
price mechanism. For efficiency reasons, we would like to compare TRs to DWL and 
it is not surprising to see that the TB of the reserves goes down to 70% of what it 
would yield under free admission pricing.  
If both reserves would be managed independently, a cost recovery pricing mechanism 
would suffice, since there is no argument which states that extra revenue should be 
diverted to other uses in the economy. However, the price differential argument 
proposes cross subsidization while keeping the total budget balanced. In our example, 
total revenue received from the two NRs should equal the total operating cost of both 
of them (1,174,050 NIS). However, revenue should not be constrained to each NR 
operating cost independently. This is the essence of price differentiation which we 
present next. 
 
6.2 Price differentiation under current operating costs 
Price differentiation should be operated in such a way as to maximize the net benefits 
of the two reserves. This is subject to revenue covering the operating costs. In the case 
of GNR and DNR it is given by: 
(6.1)     Max TB = TBg + TBd                                                              
  s.t 
(6.2)     Pg * Vg + Pd * Vd = TC 
This in our case can be written as: 
(6.3)     TCM = TCMg + TCMd = 1,066,050 + 108,000 = 1,174,050  
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Since variable cost is negligible, net benefit is equivalent to total benefit in this case. 
The total operating cost equals 1,174,050 NIS and it should be covered exactly by 
revenues generated at the two sites. Solving the model assigns prices in such a way 
that not only equation (6.3) is satisfied but also (6.1) is maximized; therefore, the 
DWL is minimized. As can be seen in figure 5.1, the demand function for GNR is less 
elastic; hence, the entrance fee should be higher than at the DNR. 
Equation (6.4) is (6.1) written in an explicit form as a Lagrange function. 
(6.4)     L = 354.49Vg – 0.00185Vg² + 30Vd – 0.00025Vd² + λ * ( 354.49Vg -      
 0.0037Vg² + 30Vd – 0.0005Vd² – 1174050 ) 
First order conditions with respect to the decision variables are given by equations 
(6.5), (6.6) and (6.7).  
(6.5)     L'(Vg) =  354.49 - 0.0037Vg + 354.49λ - 0.0074Vgλ = 0 
(6.6)     L'(Vd) =  30 - 0.0005Vd + 30λ - 0.001Vdλ = 0 
(6.7)     L'(λ) =  354.49Vg - 0.0037Vg² + 30Vd – 0.0005Vd² – 1174050 = 0 
Equating (6.5) and (6.6) yields the expansion path equation which after some 
manipulation is described by (6.8): 
(6.8)    Vg = 1.597Vd 
The last equation is the condition which should hold for every budget constraint with 
respect to the ration between the visitors at both NRs in order to minimize DWL. 
Substituting (6.8) in (6.1) yields a quadratic function from which only the positive 
root of Vd is of interest. The other variables are then easily discovered by trivial 
substitutions in the relevant equations. Before presenting the results and comparing 
them to the previous pricing mechanisms, we present the shadow price in equation 
(6.9): 
    0397.0
30001.0
0005.030
)9.6( 



Vd
Vd
       
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 This is equal to about 4% which can be thought of as the shadow price of the system 
of NRs when comparing them to some other alternatives in the economy. 
The comparative analysis is presented in table 6.3. Note that the only relevant policy 
to compare to is that of cost recovery. 
Table 6.3 about here 
 
Under joint management (which is actually carried out by price differentiation) we 
can see that there is a price increase in GNR to 12.05 (5%) and a decrease in the 
admission price to the DNR to 1.02 (47%). Due to that price change, there is a slight 
increase in the amount of visitors to the DNR (1808 visitors) while a slight decrease 
in the number of visitors to the GNR (148). Combining the net effect, we notice an 
increase of 1660 visitors at both NRs (about 1.1% compared to the independent 
management). 
The results are promising because overall, the net benefit increases, the total number 
of visitors increases as well and most importantly, the price increase is small relative 
to the price decrease.  
 
7. Results: Pricing under development plans 
Financing operation costs ignores the endogenous part of costs in the decision making 
process. Preserving nature can be done in several ways and each one incurs different 
costs. As explained earlier, the goal of this paper is to demonstrate the role of pricing 
under such a plan. We chose to concentrate in the DNR since it is an example of an 
open reserve. Such reserves suffer from lack of proper investment which causes not 
only inappropriate treatment of visitors, but also degradation of environmental and 
natural conditions. 
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Visitors to the DNR who answered the Travel Cost survey, were provided with 
information about inappropriate management capabilities and were asked about their 
frequency of future visits if those conditions were to be improved (Becker and 
Choresh, 2007; Eagan and Herriges, 2006; Fleischer and Tsur, 2000). Based on the 
new visitation rate we re-estimated a new demand function which is above the 
previous one. This equation is given in 7.1. 
(7.1)    Pd = 37.83 – 0.0005Vd   
Costs of upgrading the services provided in the reserves were estimated after a 
detailed consultation with the local ranger. The total cost is estimated at 639,000 NIS. 
Note that with respect to the previous cost (108,000 NIS) there is an increase of 
531,000 NIS (592%). Our analysis was done with respect to full consideration of the 
possible upgrade opportunities. One can also analyze partial investment policies.  
The benefits were derived by the difference in the average net benefit per visitor times 
the number of visitors at the given investment level (current or upgraded). This was 
estimated at 4,324,388 NIS. It is 3.42 million NIS more than the previous benefit level 
(Benefit ratio of 4.8)
8
. The net benefit of the upgrade plan is, therefore, given by 
equation 7.2: 
(7.2)    NB = (4.32 – 0.90) – (0.64 – 0.11) = 2.89 million NIS. 
This is clearly a Pareto improving plan. The question is, however, how we finance it 
under the price regimes analyzed previously, namely, independent versus joint 
management. 
We compare only the cost recovery pricing mechanism, since this is the only 
interesting scenario to compare for an entire system of reserves (two in our case). 
                                                 
8  Other benefits include reduction in rescue teams and the reduced cost of injuries and fatalities due to 
unnecessary accidents in the gorge itself. 
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For independent management we equate equation (7.1) to 639,000 NIS. For a joint 
management scenario we substitute in equation (6.2) 639,000 NIS instead of 108,000 
NIS and solve for maximum of equation (6.1) subject to (6.2) being satisfied. The 
results are presented in table 7.1
9
. 
Table 7.1 about here 
 
When there is independent management and the development plan is on the table, 
there should be a sharp increase in the entrance fee at DNR up to 12.73 NIS. This is 
an increase of 10.81 NIS relative to the current situation. Despite the fact that due to a 
higher price, visitors can enjoy a higher quality reserve, such a dramatic increase in 
admission fee can spark antagonistic reactions. A joint management policy, on the 
other hand, puts most of the burden on GNR and thus creates a much lower price 
increase in both reserves. The increase is only 5 NIS in GNR and 1 NIS in the DNR. 
It is also interesting to note that there is a possibility of self- sustaining financing with 
the development plan. An independent management policy in the DNR has the ability 
to generate 639,000 NIS; the reason being that despite the dramatic increase in the 
admission price, the quality of the site attracts more visitors. Hence the number of 
visitors enables the NR to collect enough funds to operate, even independently, 
without cross subsidy. This is in contradiction to Laarman and Gregerson (1996) who 
claim that in general, development plans are not self sustaining.  
 
7. Summary 
                                                 
9  The shadow price on the constraint is given by: λ = 
83.37001.0
0005.083.37


Vd
Vd
 = 0.0574 .That is about 
50% more then the shadow price of the budget constraint under independent management and no 
development.  
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Managing NRs is a complex task because there are several objectives that are usually 
in conflict with one another. Revenue generation, congestion management and 
provision of the site as a public good are goals that must be addressed carefully. Due 
to the fact that these goals are somewhat mutually exclusive, optimal management 
must take into account the multifaceted nature of NR services.  Unfortunately, there 
are not so many management practices that NR authorities can really employ. 
Available techniques can be thought of as either quantity or price management. 
Quantity management limits the quantity of visitors to a site through the use of 
queuing, or requiring reservations at specific entrance points or specific days. Pricing 
strategies are usually associated with entrance fees although there can be other ways 
to achieve them. 
This paper deals with NR pricing strategies with an Israeli case study. Two NRs were 
analyzed: Gamla nature reserve which is a "closed reserve" where one has to pay 
admission at the entrance point and Darga river nature reserve which is an open 
reserve where entrance is free. 
In the first part of the paper, we dealt with four pricing strategies: Free access, cost 
recovery, maximum revenue and price differentiation according to sites. A trade-off 
was traced between revenue and efficiency which can be of help to policy makers. It 
was found that a differential pricing system yields minimum DWL while still 
generating the required revenue to operate both sites. This, however, requires visitors 
in one site to pay for operational costs in the other. 
In the second part of the paper we dealt with a development plan to be considered at 
the open reserve. It was shown that on cost benefit grounds, the plan is Pareto 
improving. It was also shown that it can be self-sustained under independent 
management. However, it is less efficient than price differentiation. Cross subsidy, 
 28 
such as the one presented in the paper, can also cause reserves to increase price less 
dramatically because the plan is financed by several reserves (In this case, only one 
financed the plan since we dealt with only two reserves).  
In Israel, price differentiation is the norm and not the exception. Not only is it 
practiced by sites but also by individuals in relation to visit frequency. However, the 
price differences are not based on a model with specific targets and given constraints. 
Thus, in Israel, and in other locations as well, price differentials might be less 
equitable but should nonetheless be given proper consideration regarding 
implementation.  
Future research can be expanded to other sources of differentiation, as mentioned 
above, and also to a larger number of reserves. For example, there might be a cluster 
of reserves close to one another which could be managed as one unit. Caution, 
however, should be given to the fact that if the reserves are close enough to each 
other, cross price elasticity should be taken into account. Thus, increasing admission 
price in one reserve can push visitors to its neighboring reserve, bringing significant 
ecological consequences.   
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Figure 4.1: Cost Benefit of NR development plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Investment plan with several NRs 
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Fig. 6.1 Demand curves for GNR and DNR
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Fig. 6.2: Price – Revenue relation at GNR
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Fig. 6.3: Price – Revenue relation at the DNR
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Fig. 6.4: DWL and TR at the GNR
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Fig. 6.5: DWL against TR at the DNR
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Table 5.1: TCM regression results - GNR 
 GNR 
Parameter (variable) 
 
Linear Semi - 
Log 
Count 
model 
Intercept 0.155* 
(2.115) 
0.114* 
(2.28) 
0.141 
(3.046)* 
Travel cost (Nis) -0.002* 
(-4.63) 
-0.001 
(0.964) 
-0.002* 
(-1.633) 
Income (5 Income 
levels) 
0.036 
(1.09) 
0.012 
(0.06) 
0.235 
(0.816) 
No. of children 0.054 
(1.083) 
0.029 
(0.542) 
0.057 
(1.082) 
Education (4 education 
levels) 
0.019 
(1.42) 
0.015 
(0.126) 
0.024 
(0.28) 
N 
Adj. R-Sq. 
243 
0.44 
243 
0.42 
243 
0.41 
Log pseudo likelihood   -991 
*Indicates significance at 95% level. 
t-values are given in parenthesis (z-values for the count data model) 
 
Table 5.2: TCM regression results - DNR 
Site DNR 
Parameter (variable) 
 
Linear Semi - 
Log 
Count 
model 
Intercept 3.881* 
(2.305) 
2.85* 
(2.49) 
3.53 
(3.32)* 
Travel cost (Nis) -0.005* 
(11.143) 
-0.0026* 
(-2.32) 
-0.005* 
(-3.93) 
Income (5 Income 
levels) 
0.026 
(1.456) 
-0.09 
(-0.08) 
0.17 
(1.09) 
No. of children 0.084 
(1.181) 
-0.045 
(-0.61) 
-0.088 
(-1.17) 
Education (4 education 
levels) 
0.020 
(1.244) 
-0.016 
(0.11) 
  0.025 
(0.14) 
N 
Adj. R-Sq. 
270 
0.49 
270 
0.47 
270 
0.44 
Log pseudo likelihood   -1063 
* Indicates significance at 95% level. 
t-values are given in parenthesis (z-values for the count data model) 
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Table 6.1: Summary for existing situation at GNR – Independent management 
(In NIS) 
 
P=354.49-0.0037Vg 
Pricing 
mechanism 
P Vg TR DWL TB TCM Profit 
Maximum 
revenue 
generation 
177 47904 8490754 4245377 12736131 1066050 7424704 
Cost recovery 11.5 92700 1066050 17872 16963637 1066050 0 
Free 
admission 
0 95808 0 0 16981508 1066050 -1066050 
 
 
Table 6.2: Summary for existing situation at DNR – Independent management 
(In NIS) 
 
P=30-0.0005Vd 
Pricing 
mechanism 
P Vd TR DWL TB TCM Profit 
Maximum 
revenue 
generation 
15 30000 450000 225000 675000 108000 342000 
Cost recovery 1.92 56153 108000 3700 896300 108000 0 
Free 
admission 
0 60000 0 0 900000 108000 -108000 
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Table 6.3: Joint management under current operating costs 
(All monetary values are in NIS) 
 
 Price Visitors Revenue DWL Benefit Costs 
GNR 
separate 
11.5 92,700 1,066,050 17,872 16,963,637 1,066,050 
DNR 
separate 
1.92 56,153 108,000 3,700 896,300 108,000 
GNR 
combined 
12.05 92552 1,174,050 20,601 17,860,857 
 
1,266,074 
DNR 
combined 
1.02 57,961 63,574 
 
 
Table 7.1: Independent pricing versus joint management under a possible 
development plan 
 
 Price Visitors Revenue Benefit Costs 
GNR 
separate 
11.5 92,700 1,066,050 16,963,637 1,066,050 
DNR 
separate 
12.73 50,198 639,000 1,268,957 639,000 
GNR 
combined 
17.25 91,145 1,572,251 18,368,893 1,705,050 
DNR 
combined 
1.84 71,975 132,434 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
